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ABSTRACT 
 
There is an increasing recognition that economically disadvantaged areas do not have an 
inherent capacity to regenerate economic activity or to deliver automatically socially 
propitious outcomes.  In such circumstances, there might be a strong case for public 
sector intervention of various types. 
 
In what follows we a case for the provision of financial resources for the establishment or 
consolidation of community social, and other, regional enterprises.  The circumstances 
underlying the impotence of markets to solve financing issues are explored, and some 
attention is given to historical attempts to address the problem.  Most importantly, we 
outline a potential new approach for the public sector in this area. 
 
An important and novel aspect of the exercise involves the government providing some 
proportion of the required finance in the form of a loan to be repaid by the enterprise only 
when and if the project becomes economically successful.  This form of government 
intervention, known as income related loans, is designed to limit the extent of economic 
risks faced by the relevant enterprise, and has the desirable equity characteristic of 
repaying to taxpayers some return to their investment.  Through reference to the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme it is explained that the essential bases of this form of 
public sector approach to financing investment is well established, both conceptually and 
in administrative terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  community investment; income related loans 
JEL Classifications:  G18, G24, G38 
 
 iii
 1
 “I’m standing on the outside, looking in, 
A room full of money and the born-to-win, 
And no amount of work’s gonna get me through the door…” 
Cold Chisel 
 
 
1. Introduction and Summary 
There is an increasing recognition that, without government assistance, market 
economies do not always deliver the socially best outcomes in a regional context.  
Economically disadvantaged areas do not have an inherent capacity to regenerate 
economic activity or to deliver automatically socially propitious outcomes.  In such 
circumstances, there might be a strong case for public sector intervention of various 
types. 
At the same time, much public money has been wasted through poorly 
constructed schemes implemented by central government without due regard for local 
conditions.  To be most effective, any intervention needs to be able to tap into and build 
upon local enterprise and drive. 
In what follows we consider the background to this issue with respect to the 
provision of financial resources for the establishment or consolidation of community 
social, and other, regional enterprises.  The circumstances underlying the impotence of 
markets to solve financing issues are explored, and some attention is given to historical 
attempts to address the problem.  Most importantly, we outline a potential new approach 
for the public sector in this area. 
The suggested program involves a partnership between three parties: financial 
institutions, the public sector and the specific social or private enterprise.  It is explained 
that the nature of private investment in a regional context might require the involvement 
of each party, and a particular form of this partnership is examined.  The steps involving 
the way in which the scheme might be instituted are suggested. 
An important and novel aspect of the exercise involves the government providing 
some proportion of the required finance in the form of a loan to be repaid by the 
enterprise only when and if the project becomes economically successful.  This form of 
government intervention, known as income related loans, is designed to limit the extent 
of economic risks faced by the relevant enterprise, and has the desirable equity 
characteristic of repaying to taxpayers some return to their investment.  Through 
reference to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme it is explained that the essential 
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bases of this form of public sector approach to financing investment is well established, 
both conceptually and in administrative terms.  
 3
PART A:  SOME BACKGROUND ISSUES 
 
2. Innovative Financial Assistance on a Regional Basis 
There is no magic solution to generating greater economic activity in depressed or 
disadvantaged regions.  Circumstances and the resources that may be garnered will differ.  
A scheme that works in one place may not work elsewhere. 
Numerous studies and numerous policy initiatives have been conducted over the 
past few decades to address what is a major economic as well as social challenge for the 
community.  An overriding theme is that, while governments should establish an overall 
policy framework, any solution will be critically dependent on local drive and enterprise.1 
Fortunately, there appears to be fertile ground in which to tap such local drive.  
Brian Murnane’s work with the Claymore community is a frequently cited example, but 
there are many others in local communities and regions throughout Australia.2  Such local 
initiative takes many forms but one particularly promising development comes under the 
banner of social enterprises. 
Social enterprises are businesses that attempt to develop self-sustaining solutions 
to longstanding social problems within fractured communities.  They are commonly 
based on business models that aim to provide returns to investors, and often entail a 
three-way pact between financial institutions, government and businesses partnerships 
and have developed.  Social enterprises have sometimes emerged because larger 
corporations are not well suited to operate in the relevant parts of the economy.  
Patrick McClure, chief executive of Mission Australia, has argued in favour of 
social enterprises:3 
The dramatic changes of the past two decades have left many Australian 
communities without the traditional social networks which connect people.  The 
growing divide between the job-rich and job-poor is just one symptom of this, but 
the cure runs much deeper than simply creating jobs.  We need to establish a 
deliberate focus on community capacity-building and encouraging social 
entrepreneurship so communities, families and individuals are provided with 
opportunities to become economically and socially engaged. 
 
                                                 
1 See especially McKinsey and Company (1994).  SGS Economics and Planning (2002) provides a 
comprehensive review of the issues. 
2 See, for example, the cases discussed in McKinsey and Company (1994) or Latham (2001). 
3 See Walker (2002). 
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The UK Department of Trade and Industry has a strategy for social enterprises,4 
which recognises that social enterprises have an impact much broader than just financial 
return.  The ability to show that a social enterprise is meeting both its financial and social 
bottom lines will be increasingly important if social enterprises are to play an expanding 
role in the delivery of public services. 
Patricia Hewitt, UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, wrote in that 
strategy:5 
Social enterprises are dynamic, progressive businesses that we can all learn from.  
They experiment and innovate, and have the advantage of being able to draw 
upon best practice in the voluntary sector, as well as the entrepreneurial flair that 
exists in the best of our companies ... this is an area where social enterprises can 
leverage real commercial advantage, often finding it much easier to attract and 
retain highly motivated staff.  Crucially, social enterprises provide a mechanism 
for bringing excluded groups into the labour market, raising skill levels and 
increasing the chance of future employability.  And, if we are to encourage a 
greater spirit of enterprise in our public services, then there is no reason why all 
the partners in this process should come from the mainstream private sector.  
There are very real opportunities, I believe, to promote social enterprise as a key 
component in the process of modernising and reforming our public services. 
 
Social enterprises are best defined in terms of how profits are distributed rather 
than, say, the types of activities in which they are engaged.  In metropolitan areas in 
Australia, they tend to be based around labour market issues.  In regional areas, they tend 
to be based on efforts to regenerate what have been declining communities. 
While social enterprises are a very promising approach to developing economic 
activity in what can be difficult regions or excluded groups in the community, other 
locally-based initiatives that may not fall under the banner of ‘social enterprise’ could 
also be encouraged.  The spectrum runs from: 
• social enterprises that may be able to bring only limited equity and other 
sources of funds to the project, but with a broad support base within the 
community; to 
                                                 
4 See http://www.dti.gov.uk/socialenterprise/strategy.htm#summary 
5 See 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/socialenterprise/documenta.pdf>http://www.dti.gov.uk/socialenterprise/documenta.p
df 
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• private companies and/or individuals where the owners will have more 
collateral available to support the project. 
 
The provision of adequate and appropriately vetted capital presents particular 
challenges for community projects and other ventures in regionally disadvantaged areas.  
This paper proposes a creative solution whereby Government facilitates the active 
involvement of financial institutions. 
For any scheme to be successful, it will have to appreciate the strengths and 
weaknesses of how financial institutions currently operate and ensure that they have 
appropriate incentives to be actively involved.  Accordingly, before examining the details 
of the proposal, the next section comments on how the financial system currently goes 
about lending for developing businesses.  The discussion focuses on small business 
although many of the ideas are more generally applicable. 
 
3. Access to Finance by Small Business 
3.1 Traditional bank finance 
The great benefit of financial deregulation has been that it has significantly 
expanded choice and the range of financial services available to customers.  Many more 
products – and variants on those products – are accessible through much more of the 
community, albeit at a price. 
In an extensive study of the availability of capital in the wake of the very tight 
financial conditions of the late 1980s, the (then) Industry Commission concluded that 
there was no evidence of finance being rationed in a generalised way other than through 
price.6  This was a significant improvement on the situation in the 1970s where the banks 
rationed credit across the board.  Subsequent studies have similarly concluded that 
finance was more readily available which is not surprising given the continued innovation 
that has occurred.7 
                                                 
6 Industry Commission (1991). Also around that time, the House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration (1991) formed similar views in a related inquiry in financial 
deregulation. 
7 For example, the adequacy of bank lending has not registered as a primary concern in the Yellow Pages 
survey of small business over the past 4 years.  On the other hand, Hindle and Rushworth (2002) found that 
while more risk capital was available, and while the high level of home ownership in Australia helped 
small business get finance, there were still difficulties in obtaining early stage equity finance and debt 
capital. 
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In an important sense, however, such studies do not address the key issues.  The 
studies are unable to detect clear market failures narrowly within the banking (or 
financial) sector and conclude that banks in the main are responding appropriately to 
customer demands. 
However, the principal concerns have been broader than just whether financial 
institutions are responding appropriately to a given set of signals.  Rather, they relate to 
how best to bring viable projects to a stage where finance will be forthcoming and the 
roles of the various parties in this process (including governments and financial 
institutions).  For example, the Industry Commission’s recommendations tended to 
involve either improving the information flows between borrowers and lenders or 
providing support for potential borrowers to develop their proposals to a standard worthy 
of consideration for finance. 
In a market economy, of course, it will be up to individuals to take the necessary 
action.  However, there are four areas where some government encouragement and/or 
intervention may be warranted: 
• assisting small business to become finance-ready; 
• the provision of start-up capital for projects where significant external benefits 
are likely such as some projects based on research and development; 
• attracting finance into regionally depressed areas; and 
• access to finance for disadvantaged groups. 
The first two of these areas will primarily involve economic objectives where the 
benefits extend beyond the project or business being financed.  In contrast, attracting 
greater finance to disadvantaged regions and groups within the community can have both 
social and economic benefits. 
The appropriate policy response to the challenges being confronted will be 
difficult.  In essence, in the case of debt finance, the relevant financial institution may not 
be prepared to lend because either: 
(i) the proposal needs further development (eg a business plan, a new corporate 
structure, or additional management or other skills); 
(ii) the project needs additional resources, possibly from public sources if there 
are potentially significant external benefits from the project; and/or 
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(iii) the financial institution does not have the resources, or the ability, to fully 
understand the nature of the project and the risks it may incur if it extends 
credit. 
 
Increased competitive pressure has meant that cross-subsidisation across banking 
products has been largely curtailed.  Consequently, banks require a cost-effective means 
of assessing and monitoring loans both individually and within specific areas of lending. 
Where feasible, banks have already implemented streamlined screening processes.  
For example, banks have been willing to offer discounts over basic mortgage loans for 
individuals who are members of particular industry associations or employees of 
particular companies.  Default rates for such individuals are presumably deemed to be 
lower than for the community as a whole and the bank does not need to embark on 
extensive screening and monitoring processes. 
But such devices are not as readily available for small business where there is 
greater variation between prospective profitability.  In fact, given the often limited size of 
the borrowings involved, it can become prohibitive to assess and closely monitor loans 
based on cash flow alone.  Partly as a consequence, banks have tended not to develop and 
maintain the skills required to lend on the basis of, primarily, a close relationship with 
and understanding of the particular business. 
Instead, small businesses – especially start-ups and small businesses that need 
capital to expand – rely heavily on personal funds and debt secured against the family 
home or another asset.  The 1995 Yellow Pages survey of small business highlighted: 
• small businesses seeking finance have typically sought debt rather than equity.  
Debt is less complicated, more readily available and does not involve an 
automatic lessening of control; and 
• most debt takes the form of bank lending and virtually all of that debt is back 
by security of some form.  For start-up businesses, this security is frequently 
the family home; for established businesses, the assets of the business can 
more frequently be used. 
Of course, a suitable form of security makes it much easier for a financial institution to 
advance credit, especially if the security is in the form of the family home where 
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valuation is not a major issue for the bank.  This is reflected in the lending rates offered 
to small business, now illustrated in Table 1.8 
Table 1 
Banks’ Indicator Lending Rates for Small Business – Feb 2002 
(per cent) 
Residential secured 
     Overdraft 6.80 
     Term loan 6.25 
Other security 
     Overdraft 7.50 
     Term loan 6.83 
Cash rate 4.25 
  Source: RBA (2002a) 
 
Banks do still offer unsecured finance to some customers under quite limited 
conditions.  But the additional costs small businesses would have to encounter even if 
they wished to seek unsecured finance means that in practice a relatively small amount is 
extended. 
Moreover, the incentive to provide quality security has seen the profile of rates 
applying to actual loans – rather than the indicator rates in the above table – bunch at 
relatively modest margins over cash.  Indeed, whereas the weighted rate for small 
business loans was over 6 percentage points above the cash rate in 1994, the margin had 
come in to 3¼ percentage points over cash by 2001. Ranges in small business rates are 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
                                                 
8 Term loans for small business are akin to variable mortgage rates, with a term typically between 10 and 
Small Business Interest Rates - Sep 2001
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3.2 The Commonwealth Development Bank 
The above discussion suggests that, while the lack of debt finance has 
progressively become a lesser constraint on small business growth, the requirement for 
cost-effective screening and monitoring by banks has meant that the system is heavily 
reliant on the quality of the security available.  For social enterprises and economically 
disadvantaged areas, this will become an issue.  In some instances there may be no 
security and in others it is unlikely to provide an adequate basis for the business 
proposition being contemplated.  An alternative approach is needed. 
The experience of the (now defunct) Commonwealth Development Bank provides 
an interesting perspective on bank lending for riskier projects.  The CDB was established 
to provide finance for, especially, small businesses where it was deemed it would not be 
available “on reasonable and suitable terms and conditions”.  Its Charter incorporated the 
following objective:9 
In determining whether or not the finance shall be provided for a person, the 
Development Bank shall have regard primarily to the prospects of the operation 
of that person becoming, or continuing to be, successful and shall not necessarily 
have regard to the value of the security available in respect of that finance. 
 
The CDB was established in the period prior to deregulation when the controls 
over banks resulted in lending to small business being rationed.  It continued after 
deregulation to lend for proposals that the major trading banks found too difficult with 
much of its business coming from referrals from the major banks. 
Moreover, it was able to do so reasonably successfully with an average return on 
equity between 1986 and 1991 of 8.2 per cent.10  The CDB tended to lend for longer 
periods and at higher rates than the major banks, but for riskier propositions.  It was able 
to operate profitably principally because it had built up considerable skills in evaluating 
business operations.  For example, a representative of the Australian Small Business 
Association observed that: 
the CDB “had accountants that were not just trained in accountancy but were 
accountants that had been used to going into business and knowing where the key 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 years. 
9 See page 211 Industry Commission (1991). 
10 The average return on equity for the major banks over this period was between about 9½ and 
12¼ per cent during this period – see Industry Commission (1991). 
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spots were to look at.  They came into my business for one and a half weeks … I 
believe that I have got a lot to thank for the approach – the way the 
Commonwealth Development Bank lent their money.”11 
 
In effect, to be able to lend high risk capital, the CDB had to build up specialist 
financial and management skills, and then apply them in a rigorous fashion.  Its rejection 
rate tended to be around 50 per cent. 
The Industry Commission recognised that these were skills that the major trading 
banks could not duplicate at the time.  Similarly, the CDB had in its Charter the option of 
taking equity positions in individual companies.  However, in large part because the CDB 
did not have these skills, it acquired only a very modest portfolio of equity positions.  
This field it left to the development capital funds. 
Deregulation meant that the CDB was forced to take on increasingly risky 
propositions as the major banks were free to adjust their operations to take the cream of 
CDB’s customers.  And with margins decreasing much further over the 1990s as outlined 
earlier, the CDB would have faced a very difficult task.  As it was, the CDB was 
integrated into the CBA when the CBA was privatised. 
 
3.3 Equity capital 
The focus in the above discussion has been debt and, for the most part, lending by 
banks.  Private equity, however, can be attractive for small, new and innovative 
businesses, especially where collateral and a track record of profitability are limited.  
Thus, it should be among the suite of options that social enterprises might tap. 
As suggested in Figure 2, the amount of venture capital invested in Australia has 
expanded quite rapidly in recent years notwithstanding a slump in the first three-quarters 
of 2002.  According to ABS estimates, at June 2001, venture capital managers had raised 
$5.7 billion in total of which $3.7 billion had been invested. 
 
                                                 
11 Industry Commission (1991), p213. 
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Figure 2 
 
At the same time, venture capital represents a small part of overall sources of 
finance for small business, both compared with debt or personal funds or with overseas 
countries.  This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
 
‘Venture capital’ is often a misnomer with much of it involving finance for the 
expansion of well-established business or management buy-outs of existing operations.  
However, the industry in Australia is maturing and it does seem to be close to 
contributing usefully to initiatives such as social enterprises.12  An interesting success 
                                                 
12 For example, Social Ventures Australia has been established to provide three services, namely a mentor 
network, a learning and development program and venture capital.  Given the novelty of the ideas, SVA is 
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story is Indigenous Business Australia which is a fund with $72.6 million in equity and 
generated an operating profit of $3.9 million in 2000-01 and $5.6 million in 2001-02.13  
And this through investing in what some in traditional areas of the finance industry might 
view as very risky projects in remote Australia. 
 
3.4 Some implications for policy 
Financial institutions have the finance, infrastructure and networks needed for the 
development of any comprehensive scheme to improve the access to capital by 
economically disadvantaged communities.  At the same time, the above discussion 
highlights that such a scheme needs to recognise: 
• support will be required to get enterprises ‘finance-ready’; 
• in particular, financial institutions currently have limited skills and resources 
in-house to screen and monitor the types of projects that are envisaged 
including social enterprises.  Accordingly, public sector involvement may be 
needed at the early stages of any project.  But over time, the policy response 
should encourage banks to build suitable in-house skills and knowledge; 
• where available, both the bank and the borrower will find it attractive to make 
use of suitable security; and 
• private equity may also be a useful complement to debt for some projects. 
 
4. The Evidence on Business Failure 
The likely extent of commercial success from financing particular ventures will 
be critical in the design of a new scheme.  There appears to be a common view that even 
well run small businesses with a potentially attractive business model have a high failure 
rate.  Reports in the press, for example, cite figures of up to 80 per cent of small 
businesses failing within the first few years of their operations.14 
This paints too gloomy a picture.  Bickerdyke et al (2000), a team of researchers 
at the Productivity Commission, have interrogated various sources of ABS and other data 
and have arrived at a quite different picture.  The ABS data have limitations.  For 
example, they relate to employing businesses only and very new businesses tend to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
targeting businesses with a track record and will not favour very small projects.  See 
www.socialventures.com.au 
13 See Australian Venture Capital Journal 2003, p 24. 
14 See examples cited by Bickerdyke et al (2000), p 24. 
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under-represented in the sample.  Nonetheless, the study provides by far the richest 
picture of business turnover available and the major findings are summarised in Figure 4. 
The distinction between business exits and business failures is important.  
Bickedyke et al calculate that around 7½ per cent of businesses exit each year (or around 
a third within five years).  Within this figure: 
• 1½ per cent exit through a change of ownership (eg a takeover); 
• 3½ per cent are solvent but exit for reasons other than the financial situation 
of the business (eg retirement or death of the owner); 
• 2 per cent are solvent but are generating insufficient returns; and  
• just ½ per cent represent bankruptcies and liquidations. 
Bickerdyke et al provide a range of other evidence that is relevant to the current proposal: 
• the ownership structure of businesses did not have a major bearing on exit 
rates; 
• smaller businesses tended to have higher exits rates than larger businesses (ie 
exit rates for businesses with less than 20 employees were close to 8 per cent 
while those for larger businesses were around 5½ per cent); and 
• exit rates declined with the age of the business. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
From the perspective of a financier, the greatest concern will be the proportion of 
business forced to exit because they become insolvent.  The ½ per cent figure cited above 
does appear to understate the overall default rates for small business for various reasons 
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associated with the surveys.  In fact, we understand that the major trading banks tend to 
use default rates in the range of 2 to 5 per cent for their internal modelling, a level that is 
still quite manageable. 
The essential message for the current proposal is that default rates for small 
business overall are relatively low despite the perception that the lending involved is very 
risky.  The processes and incentives in place for both the borrower and lender are such 
that suitable finance is flowing to much of the sector.  In addition, there is the potential to 
judiciously tweak the current arrangements to facilitate finance for slightly different 
activities as advocated in this paper. 
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PART B:  FINANCING FOR DISADVANTAGED REGIONS: 
A SUGGESTED SCHEME 
 
5. An Integrated Programme 
It is critical that the three parties involved, namely the enterprise, government and 
financial institutions, all contribute financially to the project.  For the enterprise the case 
for having some involvement is to minimise both “adverse selection” and “moral 
hazard”. 
In the absence of some finance from the enterprise itself, adverse selection takes 
the form of those willing to participate being those least likely to succeed, since it is 
likely they have had difficulty finding assistance otherwise.  This prospect is reduced 
because the enterprise is demonstrating that it is prepared to face some financial losses 
with respect to the project. 
Moral hazard is likely to be more important and takes the form of there being 
lower incentives to make the enterprise succeed when there are low or zero costs from 
failure.  That is, if the government simply offered a grant to a project so that there was no 
need for the enterprise to put some of its own resources in jeopardy, there would be less 
incentive for the enterprise to succeed. 
Having support from the public sector is justified because of the presumed social 
benefits of the project and/or market failure in the financial system.  This does not 
necessarily mean that there will be large subsidies, because the form of the collection of 
this part of the debt – that is, depending on the future profits of the enterprise – in itself 
constitutes a benefit for borrowers that can only be provided by the public sector. 
The active involvement of the banking sector will be particularly important.  It 
has the infrastructure in place to raise the capital, screen applicants and monitor 
performance.  It is not feasible to try to replicate those attributes with an entirely new 
structure. 
At the same time, only limited finance is finding its way to community and other 
projects of concern here.  The banks are not attuned to the types of issues that arise and 
the cost of building the necessary skills and systems could make such lending prohibitive.  
Furthermore, the experience with the CDB does not provide much encouragement that 
banks, unaided, would move far down such a path. 
One possible option would be to introduce broader social objectives into banks’ 
licence conditions.  In effect, this is the case in the United States where banks are 
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required to meet targets associated with particular groups in the community.  In recent 
years, corporate Australia – and the major banks in particular – have increasingly 
recognised that being actively involved in addressing social objectives can make good 
business sense.  Against this background, there is the opportunity to develop schemes that 
build on the banks’ existing operations with various government programs. 
The above discussion highlights the desirability of a program that contains the 
following three characteristics: 
• sufficient flexibility to ensure an ability to support local initiatives that may 
come in the form of quite different ownership structures.  In particular, the 
nature and extent of collateral will vary as will responsibility or accountability 
for the project’s success.  The extent and mode of financial support will vary 
across projects; 
• an alignment of incentives with, for example, sufficient equity or other forms 
of commitment from the borrower to foster the project’s commercial viability; 
and 
• the support from government to get projects to a stage where they are finance-
ready. 
 
Any such project will need initial vetting and then close monitoring throughout.  
It is unrealistic to assume that government could play a useful ongoing monitoring role; 
rather, it is best placed to help projects get off the ground, and do so in a way to 
maximise their chance of ultimate success. 
From the government’s point of a view, a two-stage approach is envisaged with a 
separate government agency involved at each stage. 
Stage 1 – Pre-financing  
The proposal would initially be vetted under a new government scheme, the 
Social Enterprise Initiative (SEI).  The SEI would be managed by a dedicated unit, say 
the Office of the SEI. 
Under the SEI, proposals would be assessed and feedback and support would be 
provided.  Where additional work is deemed necessary to develop proposals to a finance-
ready stage, the SEI would be able to: 
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• tap into the range of programs already in existence (including those under the 
AusIndustry umbrella); and 
• provide grant money to partially fund the refinement of proposals eg for the 
production of a detailed business plan.  The level of such grants would vary, 
but could range between say $5,000 and $50,000.  
In some instances, the feedback from the SEI may take the form of identifying 
gaps in management or other skills that the enterprise will need to satisfy a financier of its 
likely commercial viability. 
Suitable proposals would then be referred for consideration for financing.  The 
SEI performs a valuable part of this process by reducing the screening costs that past 
experience suggests would seriously restrict the extent of private funding that would be 
forthcoming. 
Stage 2 – Financing 
There are three parties to the financing: the enterprise, the government and the 
relevant financial institution.  In most projects being considered, the additional private 
finance being sought will take the form of debt and the financial institution will be a 
bank.  However, private equity injections will be appropriate for some proposals and it is 
important that the vetting process does keep this option open.  Indeed, the involvement 
of, say, a venture capital fund may bring more management skills to the table than would 
a bank. 
The Government’s role in assisting the financing would be the responsibility of 
the Office of Social Enterprise Finances (SEF).  This would be a quite separate agency to 
the Office of the SEI in order to ensure that financing decisions are made on an arms-
length basis from the development of any proposal.15 
Public financial support will take the form of profit related loans.  Having support 
from the public sector is justified because of the social benefits of the project and/or 
market failure in the financial system.  This support takes two forms, namely any subsidy 
embedded in the loan itself and the fact that the form of the collection of this part of the 
debt – that is, depending on the future profits of the enterprise – in itself constitutes a 
benefit for borrowers that can only be provided by the public sector.  These issues are 
explored in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
15 That is, the two stages will assist in the governance aspects of the public sector’s involvement. 
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As outlined above, the possible projects will inevitably represent a spectrum with 
some having a stronger community element while others will have a stronger private 
element: 
• a project with minimal social benefits may still be attractive since (i) funds 
would still be flowing into a depressed area; (ii) the individual(s) involved 
would be required to provide greater collateral making monitoring and the 
involvement of the banks easier; and (iii) the overall scheme could more 
readily reach a scale that is attractive to the continuing involvement of banks.  
The contribution from public funds would also be less for individual projects 
where the social benefits are low. 
• the benefits to be derived from broader community-based projects would be 
larger, but some inherent difficulties would have to be overcome.  In 
particular, it may be more difficult to get real ownership from the principals 
involved (and thereby minimise moral hazard problems).  For example, the 
initial contributions may have come from community fund-raisings with the 
drivers of the project being motivated by doing “good works” rather than a 
stronger commercial imperative.  In such circumstances, suitable buy-in by 
those involved can still be achieved, but the design, selection and monitoring 
elements of the scheme become critical. 
 
Accordingly, the Office of the SEF will determine the appropriate level of profit-
contingent loans depending upon the expected community benefits from the project and 
the extent of the buy-in from those involved in the enterprise.  There could also be the 
option for the Office of the SEF to provide some direct grant for particularly desirable 
projects if this were deemed necessary to make the project a viable commercial 
proposition.  Many different possibilities are available with respect to the examples 
considered in Section 7. 
After determining the extent of public support, the Office of SEF would 
coordinate with the relevant financial institution – eg bank or venture capital fund – to 
bring the full package of financing together.  The examples in the following Section 7 
provide illustrations of the appropriate balance between each element. 
As an aside, the above stressed the need for the close involvement of a bank (or 
other financial institution) to ensure that the projects operate as commercially as possible.  
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However, at the initial stages, the banks may be reluctant to be involved given the limited 
size of the program and the lack of a track record: 
• accordingly, in might be necessary in the early stages for the program to 
operate as a pilot with banks being paid a fee for vetting/monitoring services. 
 
As the program becomes established, the scheme could in principle be open to 
any bank.  Instead, we recommend that banks tender to assume the role of principal debt 
financier for the scheme.  The successful bid would be based more on the nature of the 
commitment the bank would bring to the task rather than any fee.  The attractions of 
having a single bank involved in the early part of the scheme include: 
• benefits for the successful bank in terms of its corporate image and, over time, 
having a head start in establishing a potentially profitable new line of 
business; and 
• for the Government, having greater confidence that there would be an ongoing 
commitment to the success of the scheme from a large financial player.  
 
6. The Background to the Collection Process: Income Related Loans 
The summary provided in the Introduction for the financing of social enterprise 
projects involves the use of a government approach to financing known as “income 
related loans”.  The background to this aspect of the proposal is now explained. 
The basic IRL idea is that agents provided with government assistance in periods 
of economic need should be expected to repay some part of this financial help when their 
future economic situation is more propitious.  This means that a social enterprise 
receiving public funds as part of the SEP would treat a proportion of the financial 
assistance as a loan to be repaid when future income – represented by profits – allow this 
to be done without compromising the viability of the initiative.  The conceptual basis, and 
some experience, of IRL are now explained. 
The first national application of an IRL was the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme adopted in 1989, in which Australian university students are able to pay tuition 
charges depending on their future incomes.16  IRL for the higher education student tuition 
and/or income support have been, or will soon be, adopted in New Zealand (1991), Chile 
(1994), South Africa (1996), the UK (to be implemented in 2005) and Thailand (to be 
                                                 
16 While in practical terms the scheme was an Australian innovation, the notion has been in the economics 
literature since at least Friedman promoted a variation of it in 1955 (Friedman, 1955). 
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implemented in 2006).  The Australian experience in particular means that we now know 
quite a lot about the effects and administration of IRL. 
The basic idea behind HECS is as follows.  In the presence of a charge on 
students, those without access to finance would not be able to attend university since 
banks in general will not lend for human capital investments.  The reason is that 
graduates’ future labour market outcomes are uncertain, and in the event of default a 
bank would have no collateral to sell (which is not the case for example with respect to a 
housing loan).  There are many different risks associated with student financing, and 
these are discussed fully in Chapman (2003). 
These risks mean that some from of government intervention is required in the 
financing of human capital investments.  Such intervention can take the form of the 
guarantee of the payment of bank loans in the event of default, the governments paying 
some of the interest on a bank loan, and/or the provision of means-tested scholarships 
that waive the obligation for qualifying students to pay tuition charges.  Many countries 
currently use varieties of these approaches, most often involving partnerships between 
commercial banks and governments (for example, in the US and Canada). 
For a variety of reasons explained in Barr (2001) and Chapman (1997), IRL are 
preferable to other approaches to financing human capital investments.  In this context, a 
critical factor relevant to their application in the financing of social enterprise projects is 
that, unlike with respect to bank loans, IRL take away the default risks for borrowers.  
That is, if future economic circumstances turn out to be poor in a particular period, a 
well-designed IRL would require no or only minimal payments.  This has the 
fundamental advantage of allowing credit risks for borrowers to be avoided. 
That is, IRLs offer insurance against the possibility of future hardship and, in the 
extreme, protection against default.  Other types of loans do not offer this type of 
security. 
There has by now been a considerable amount of research on HECS.  With 
respect to the financing of social enterprise projects two particular facts are relevant.  The 
first is that the scheme has had no adverse consequences for the access to university of 
relatively poor prospective students, whose numbers increased by about 40 per cent in the 
1988-99 period (Chapman and Ryan, forthcoming).  An interpretation of this is that, not 
only did HECS in reality offer default-protection for students, it was also apparently seen 
to do so.  
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The other fact is that the collection of HECS revenue, through the Australian Tax 
Office, has turned out to be very efficient. In administration terms it costs less than 4 per 
cent of the $1 billion revenue now raised annually.  Thus while before its introduction in 
1988 Australian tax authorities warned against the alleged major administrative 
complexities, this has turned out not to be the case.17 
Several other possible applications of the basic principle of IRL have been 
developed over recent years.  The following examples are of interest: 
(i) For the financing of drought relief (Botterill and Chapman, 2004);  
(ii) With respect to student income support (Chapman, 1992);  
(iii) For the collection of low level criminal fines (Chapman, Freiberg, Quiggin 
and Tait, 2004);  
(iv) To recover a portion of taxpayer’s subsidies from subsidised elite athletes 
(Denniss and Hamilton, 2003);  
(v) For the provision of housing credits for low-income individuals (Gans and 
King, 2003); and 
(vi) With respect to the collection of fines associated with collusion and insider 
trading (Chapman and Denniss, 2003). 
In addition, there is the potential for a host of additional applications, including involving 
R&D expenditure and other government assistance to industry. 
What HECS and the above potential IRL applications have in common are the 
following.  One, generally they involve the government providing a default-protected 
loan mechanism for the particular beneficiaries, usually in a situation in which the 
commercial banks would be reluctant to take on the associated risks.  Two, they allow the 
potential for the recovery of a proportion of taxpayer subsidies to specific activities, but 
only in the situation in which members of the targeted group are experiencing propitious 
later circumstances.  That is, IRL have the potential to both improve the functioning of 
markets and to promote equity.18 
The application of an IRL for social enterprise activities fits neatly into the above 
contexts, and has the following advantages: 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the implementation debate with the Australian Taxation Office, see Edwards (2000). 
18 These notions fit comfortably with recent innovations in policy thought promoted by both Moss (2002) 
and Shiller (2003). 
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(i) The approach could act to improve the functioning of loan markets where 
social enterprise activities are below what a government might consider to 
be optimal; 
(ii) Because some part of taxpayers’ subsidies would be recovered when the 
enterprise is succeeding commercially, there is an important equity 
dimension;  
(iii) Not only is it fair that average taxpayers don’t eventually foot the bill for all 
subsidies to successful enterprises, the fact that there are returns to the 
public sector should also be seen to be desirable because the associated 
potential to reduce Commonwealth budgetary pressures.  The repayments 
thus allow the financing of more social enterprise projects than could be 
forthcoming if the scheme was solely grant financed (or lower taxes, or 
higher provision of alternative government services); and 
(iv) IRLs essentially provide a form of revenue (or profit) smoothing, and thus 
diminish financial pressures on enterprises at the time in which this is most 
needed. 
 
7. Illustrative Detailed Examples of Profit-related Financing for Disadvantaged 
Communities 
The proposal advocated in this paper is aimed at providing better access to 
finance for a wide range of commercial and not-for-profit operations.  Projects will vary 
considerably based on scale, the extent to which broader public benefits accrue, the 
nature of the commercial activity and the sophistication of the management team. 
As such, for any scheme to be effective it will have to be flexible enough to 
respond to the specific circumstances.  The incentives faced by each of the three 
stakeholders – that is, the proponents of the project, the financial institution and the 
government – will have to be suitably calibrated.  Accordingly, the proposed Office of 
the SEI and, especially, the Office of the SEF19 will require a degree of flexibility in 
setting key parameters for each individual project. 
This flexibility, unfortunately, introduces a degree of complexity in the detailed 
arrangements for the scheme.  Some of this complexity could have been avoided by 
designing a more rigid scheme; however, we judged that it is important for the incentives 
                                                 
19 See Section 5 for a description of these Offices. 
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and obligations be introduced into each project in a way that is apposite for the specific 
circumstances. 
What this does mean, however, is that the explanation of how the scheme will 
apply in practice becomes multi-faceted.  The following discussion is designed to 
illustrate how the scheme would work in practice and provide a sense of how, over time, 
a significant proportion of funds outlaid can be expected to be returned to the taxpayer.  
Throughout it is important to recognise the basic motivation and structure that was 
outlined in Section 5 and runs through all of the examples now considered. 
The discussion considers four generic types of projects which we will term 
‘Cases’.  In turn, within each generic Case, some projects will be (financially) successful, 
some will struggle but stay afloat, while some will fail.  The worked examples assume a 
mix of success rates within each Case. 
The different Cases are characterised by whether: 
• they are for-profit or not-for-profit ventures; and 
• the degree of access they may have to assets that can be used as security for 
debt finance. 
In particular, the four generic Cases are: 
• Case (A) – Profit-making ventures that require a fair amount of physical 
capital (eg building or equipment).  These assets can be used as security for 
bank debt.  
• Case (B) – Profit-making ventures that require less physical capital, but where 
a longer period of cash flow support may be needed for the projects to become 
viable.  (For example, customer relationships will take time to establish for 
companies in the service sector.) 
• Case (C) – Not-for-profit businesses with high turnover and low margins on 
goods sold (eg retail businesses). 
• Case (D) – Not-for-profit business with higher margins on goods sold but 
higher labour costs (eg companies providing business services). 
 
The repayment conditions are critical to an understanding of how the model 
works.  The Office of the SEF will set these conditions at the outset for each project.  In 
all cases, the enterprise will enter into a conventional contract with the bank, agreeing to 
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meet a stream of (interest and principal) repayments along the lines as would apply in any 
commercial relationship.  
 
In contrast, the repayment conditions for the funds from the government sector 
will be quite different because they take the form of an income related loan and will vary 
according to the nature of the venture involve.  In particular, the extent to which the 
projects can be expected to deliver commercial returns will have a critical bearing on 
which income base is used as the basis for repayment for the income contingent loan.   
Consider first those projects expected to make a commercial rate of return.  
Projects falling under either Case (A) or Case (B) are aimed to be profit-making ventures 
where the element of public financing is made contingent on future profits.  Where 
feasible, having payments based on profits has the desirable feature of minimising any 
distortionary effects on decision-making.  Consequently, it is proposed that repayments 
of the government loan be based on earnings after interest but before tax.20  (They are 
most appropriately viewed as being an income contingent interest payment rather than a 
tax.) 
On the other hand, there will also be situations where ventures are undertaken 
either by not-for profit organisations or where there is a strong community element 
involved and future profits are expected to be quite low.21  Thus, for Cases (C) and (D), it 
is proposed that financing be contingent on operating margins (ie as per the base for the 
GST). 
Note that in each case, repayments are based on information that is already 
collected.  In administrative terms this would seem to be straightforward.  When the 
government loan finances are provided, the amount would be registered as a debt with the 
ABN of the enterprise, and collected in the future in much the same way that HECS 
operates, although with profits or operating margins in this case, not individual incomes, 
forming the basis of the collection.22 
These examples only involve debt financing (including profit-contingent debt 
from the Government).  Section 5 also canvassed the option of providing equity finance 
                                                 
20 That is, for tax purposes, the repayments are akin to interest payments rather than a top up to corporate 
taxes. 
21 Indeed, the primary motivations for many projects may not be profit-related and prudent financing of the 
project could not be realistically based on an expected stream of profits. 
22 Botterill and Chapman (forthcoming) suggest and explain a similar arrangement for farmers to repay 
some proportion of drought relief. 
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from, for example, a pooled development fund.  The analysis that follows can be readily 
extended to such a situation. 
In each Case, there will be numerous parameters that need to be taken into 
account for the Office of the SEF to determine the precise arrangements to apply to each 
project.  Also, the likelihood of success – both in terms of the project evolving into a 
long-term viable entity and in what financial returns the Government can anticipate from 
its initial outlay – will vary.  
For ease of exposition, Case (A) is described in some detail with a discussion of 
the sensitivity of the results to the main parameters involved.  This sensitivity analysis 
carries over to the other Cases and thus the discussion of these is much briefer.  
Finally, it must be stressed that these worked illustrations are just examples.  The 
precise parameters will be subject to the experience with pilot programmes as well as 
detailed negotiations with the various stakeholders (including financial institutions).  And 
when operational, will be subject to fine-tuning by the Office of the SEF to suit the needs 
of the specific project. 
 
7.1 Case (A): A commercial venture with a need for physical capital 
Description of the type of business 
The types of business envisaged in the first set are for-profit ventures that require 
physical capital such as buildings or assets that are able to be leased.  For example, this 
may include a retail business or a specialist business in a trade that calls for the use of 
motor vehicles and perhaps specialist equipment.  In either case, there will be security to 
support at least some of the financing. 
In every example that follows, it is assumed that $100,000 is required.  This 
amount can obviously be scaled to reflect the reality of particular projects under the 
scheme. 
The funds come from three sources: 
• A financial institution is assumed to provide $50,000 line of credit up front.  
The loan is secured against initially a book value of $60,000 of physical 
assets.  Given that this credit will attract interest, and the Government is paid 
out of after-interest profits, the risk for the financial institution is low even 
though the project may be deemed to be high risk.  Accordingly, a real interest 
rate of 5½ per cent is assumed.  (Any surplus cash is assumed to attract a 
similar interest rate in an offset account.) 
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These parameters are designed as a balance between making the proposition sufficiently 
attractive for the financial institution to be involved and to leave it with enough risk so 
that it continues to devote appropriate resources to monitoring and managing the project 
and its position.23  The parameters would be refined with greater experience in lending in 
such novel circumstances. 
• The government is assumed to provide $30,000 in the form of a contingent 
debt labelled ‘Social Enterprise Contingent Debt’ or SECD.24  While the 
government is happy to seed the project, it may be desirable for it to have an 
ability to scrutinise both the progress of the project and the commitment of the 
financial institution in the first few years.  Accordingly, the $30,000 is 
assumed to be paid in three equal instalments. 
The real interest rate to apply on the SECD is assumed to be 8 per cent for the 
first 5 years of the project.  Thereafter, it would be set at 4 per cent, which is 
roughly the government’s cost of funds.  Repayments are contingent on the 
operation being successful.  They are assumed to be 25 per cent of earnings 
(after interest but before tax) as long as such earnings are positive.25 
• The proponents of the project are assumed to contribute $20,000 of capital up 
front.  An equity contribution will help to align the incentive structure, 
although the precise level of such a contribution would be determined on a 
case by case basis and will vary depending upon the extent of public benefits. 
 
For ease of exposition, it is assumed that the project loses money in the first year, 
breaks even in the second year and then makes a constant return on the initial capital 
thereafter (unless it goes bankrupt).  Of course, successful projects will grow over time 
whereas others will struggle.  All calculations have been carried out in today’s dollars. 
                                                 
23 For example, the financial institution is likely to receive less than its $50,000 exposure from the sale of 
the physical assets in a fire-sale situation. 
24 As outlined in the text, the Government may also fund some of the initial feasibility work through the 
Office of the SEI.  Such funding is assumed to be in the form of grants and is not included in the worked 
examples. 
25 While such a payment may appear to be akin to a tax, it is best viewed as an agreed arrangement to repay 
debt according to the profitability of the operation.  Nonetheless, the repayment parameter selected will 
have to recognise possible disincentive effects if it is too high.  A repayment rate of 25 per cent from 
before-tax earnings means that the enterprise is able to retain 48 cents in the dollar of earnings after interest 
while the government loan is being repaid.  (In practice, the enterprise in the early years is likely to have 
tax losses carried forward and the effective tax rate – and any resultant disincentive effects – will be lower 
and the amount retained higher than the 48 cents in the dollar cited here.) 
 27
To illustrate the profile of the development of the projects and the repayment 
streams from the Government’s initial outlay, the projects are assumed to fall into four 
‘categories’: 
• Category 1 – ‘survival’: these projects are assumed to struggle to stay afloat, 
generating an assumed rate of return on capital of 6 per cent, that is, just 
above the cost of bank finance and above the interest rate applied to SECD 
debt after the first five years. 
• Category 2 – ‘solid growth’: these projects prosper and would comfortably 
service debt and meet various benchmarks.  This situation is characterised in 
what follows as generating returns on a fixed initial capital of 12 per cent.  
Alternatively, similar results in terms of the project’s ability to service debt 
would be achieved if a somewhat lower rate of return were assumed but with 
retained earnings feeding into a greater expansion in the project. 
• Category 3 – ‘success’: these are the real (financial) success stories with an 
assumed rate of return on capital of 20 per cent.  (Again, the results would be 
similar if there were a somewhat lower return on capital but with retained 
earnings being used to expand the project.) 
• Category 4 – ‘failure’: those projects that are wound up within a few years 
without delivering any returns to the public coffers; 
Key financial variables for the first three of these situations are depicted in the following 
charts: 
• Earnings before interest and tax simply reflects the assumed losses in the first 
few years followed by the 6 per cent return on $100,000 of initial capital. 
• Net equity starts at $20,000, but is eroded in the initial years by the assumed 
losses plus the servicing costs on bank debt.  It steadily recovers as profits are 
able to finance bank debt, the SECD and, after initial tax losses are offset, 
corporate tax.  Note that net equity includes both tax losses and the 
(contingent) liability to the Government, even though both these items will be 
uncertain in the initial years. 
• The outstanding SECD increases in the initial years as the Government’s 
contributions are outlaid.  The extent to which it is reduced in subsequent 
years reflects the extent to which payments exceed the assumed rate on this 
debt. 
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Note that, in the ‘Survival’ category of businesses, the outstanding SECD liability 
is only reduced very gradually since profits are low.  A modification in some of the key 
parameters could bring forward the repayment stream.  In addition, the project owners 
may wish to do so in any case.26  However, given this business is assumed to be operating 
near the edge, it is inevitable that the outstanding liability to the Government will persist 
for a considerable period. 
The other two groups of businesses are assumed to be more profitable and 
repayment occurs earlier, namely after around a decade of profitability for businesses 
generating 12 per cent returns and after 4 years of profits for businesses generating 20 per 
cent. 
 
                                                 
26 In particular, the design of the system provides a modest tax incentive for early repayment given that any 
repayment of the debt – as with any interest charge – is tax deductible. 
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Obviously, the extent to which the entire programme will be self-financing will 
depend on the profile of projects that are supported.  Effective selection and support from 
the Offices of the SEI and SEF will be critical as will the continuing monitoring by the 
financial institution and, in many instances, the local community. 
Inevitably some businesses will not succeed.  The evidence cited earlier 
concerning default rates for lending to SMEs suggests that this ratio may be relatively 
low, although the novelty of many of the projects to be supported will make the exercise 
more risky from a narrow financial perspective. 
The following chart illustrates the overall impact of the returns to the public purse 
assuming 20 per cent of businesses fail, 30 per cent ‘survive’ (by delivering average 
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returns of 6 per cent), 30 per cent provide ‘solid’ 12 per cent returns and 20 per cent are 
financial ‘success’ stories generating 20 per cent returns. 
 
 
 
 
The chart indicates that the initial $30,000 outlay would almost be recovered after 
15 years.27 
 
7.2 Case (B): A Commercial Venture with a Need for Cash Flow Support 
The types of business envisaged in the second set are for-profit ventures that 
require longer gestation periods to become financially viable, as well as a need for less 
physical capital.  Many of the businesses being envisaged would be in the services sector 
where reputation, brand and an innovative product are potentially cornerstones for the 
business. 
Compared with Case (A), there would be less security available on which to 
support bank credit.  Accordingly, the main changes when compared with Case (A) are: 
• a longer period before the business becomes profitable.  In the following 
example, break even is achieved in the fourth year and consistent profits 
thereafter; and 
• the requirement that the project proponents inject a larger amount of equity.  
In particular, it is assumed that the typical project would require $30,000 
credit from a financial institution, a $30,000 contingent loan from the 
Government and $40,000 of equity from the proponents. 
 
                                                 
27 Assuming a real discount rate of 4 per cent, the NPV of the repayments is around $21,000 after 15 years. 
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The remaining parameters are the same as in Case (A).  The results are qualitatively 
similar as illustrated in the following summary chart. 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Case (C): A Not-for-profit Business with high Turnover28 
The final two cases relate to either not-for-profit businesses or businesses that are 
judged to have a strong community value but with little chance of generating significant 
profits.  Accordingly, repayments cannot be based on a direct measure of profits.  Instead, 
it is proposed that they be based on margins as is done with the GST base. 
The challenged that needs to be finessed is to design a system that can cope with 
both: 
• businesses with relatively low margins on a high turnover of goods such as in 
the case of businesses in the wholesale or retail industries (Case (C)); and 
• businesses with minimal inputs of goods but where the costs largely relate to 
labour (Case (D)).  Margins (that is, the difference between cost of goods 
bought and sold) will be quite large. 
In each of these Cases, the parameters have been calibrated for the different extent 
of financial success to be roughly comparable with the four categories of success used 
above, namely ‘survival’, ‘solid growth’, ‘success’ and ‘failure’. 
The major design characteristic that needs to be carefully selected here will be the 
repayment parameter.  This applies to margins, that is, before operating expenses.  For 
high turnover, low margin, businesses such as wholesale operations, an unduly high 
                                                 
28 Note that while we are considering not-for-profit entities, this does not preclude the particular project 
being profitable and generating an income stream for the rest of the entity.   
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parameter will see the SECD being repaid promptly but at the risk of sending the 
business into bankruptcy. 
In (Case (C)), we have assumed that goods are sold with an average mark-up of 
36 per cent.  This mark-up is used to pay operating expenses and service bank and SECD 
debt.  We also assume that 3 per cent of the margins is used to repay SECD liabilities.29 
Two features of the results are important for our discussions: 
• the SECD repayment profile is not as sensitive to fluctuations in the 
underlying profitability of the project (that is, in comparison with the earlier 
Cases where repayments were directly based on profits).  Thus, in the 
following chart, the trajectory of the repayments for the different categories of 
projects are more tightly bunched than for Cases (A) and (B); and 
• related to this, the fate of any project in the ‘survival’ range will be sensitive 
to small fluctuations in some of the key parameters including the repayment 
rate.30  It then becomes crucial that the arrangements agreed at the outset with 
the Office of the SEF are carefully calibrated. 
 
                                                 
29 Note that 3 per cent of operating margins in Case (C) yields a similar repayment stream as 25 per cent of 
earning (after income but before tax) in Case (A). 
30 To some extent, this sensitivity reflects the mechanical nature of the experiments conducted here.  If 
market conditions allow the project some flexibility in adjusting margins and/or scale, the project will be 
able to be more robust. 
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7.4 Case (D): A Not-for-profit Business with Low Turnover and Higher Operating 
Expenses 
The final case will typically involve a service business with significant labour 
costs within its operating expenses.  Given that operating margins (ie the gap between 
costs of goods and services bought and sold) is larger here than in Case (C), the 
repayment rate will need to be corresponding lower.  In the following chart, a repayment 
rate of 1.8 per cent of the operating margin is assumed. 
 
 
 
The above examples illustrate how a few key parameters can be adjusted to take 
into account the precise nature of the project involved.  In each of the examples, the 
Government can provide critical support to get otherwise what can be difficult projects 
off the ground.  At the same time, the incentives that the project will face ensure that 
financial viability remains a key objective and the impact on the public purse over time is 
minimised. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Fresh approaches are needed to channel increased financial resources in 
economically disadvantaged sections of the community.  Success stories are 
accumulating throughout the country with, for example, the rise of some promising social 
enterprises.  But for such initiatives to reach a scale where substantial benefits accrue 
throughout the communities, the active involvement of government and financial 
institutions will be needed alongside local enterprises. 
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This paper advocates a scheme based on profit related loans.  The scheme 
provides a mechanism whereby both banks and government contribute to social and other 
private enterprises, but where the drive and responsibility for success of individual 
projects rests squarely with the enterprise.  Taxpayers will get a return from their 
investment in successful enterprises. 
Because of the originality of the scheme, it is critical that there is some 
experimentation at the outset, perhaps through the introduction of different pilot 
programs.  With flexibility and the obvious potential for learning by doing, the basis for a 
firmer public sector commitment, and its nature, should be forthcoming. 
Moreover, even as the scheme develops, the lending advocated here will entail 
risk.  New businesses will be created and a number of them will fail.  It is important not 
to shy away from such experimentation and natural selection.  Indeed, as the OECD has 
emphasised, the ability to create new businesses and to replace poorly performing ones 
can be a major determinant of an economy’s overall economic performance.31  These 
ideas are arguably more apt when applied to economically disadvantaged areas where the 
greater vitality has the potential to bring both economic and social benefits. 
 
                                                 
31 See Bickerdyke et al (2000) for a discussion of this point. 
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Appendix 
 
Sensitivity Analysis of Case (A) 
Section 7 presented key results for the worked examples of various potential projects.  
This Appendix briefly explores how sensitive those results are to changes in key 
parameters.  Only Case (A) is examined here, bur the general conclusions apply to the 
other types of businesses that are discussed in the text. 
 
The first chart illustrates the results of tinkering with the key parameters on the 
contingent liabilities to the Government.  It examines (i) the impact of rasing the 
repayment rate from 25 per cent to 50 per cent; and (ii) increasing the interest rate on that 
debt to 10 per cent for the first 5 years and 8 per cent thereafter. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 
 
 
 
The results are intuitively reasonable.  The higher repayment rate does bring forward the 
income stream while the largest impact of a higher interest rate is to increase the 
outstanding amount of debt.  The shift in parameters in each case was considered to be 
quite sizeable, but the overall impact was not very large. 
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The next chart illustrates the impact of (i) an increase in the rate of interest applied to 
bank credit; and (ii) a reduction in the proportion of ‘failures’ (from 20 to 15 per cent) 
and ‘survival’ cases (from 30 to 20 per cent). 
 
Appendix Figure 2 
 
 
 
Again, the results are largely as expected.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the most useful 
change from the point of view of the programme becoming self-financing is to limit the 
number of ‘failures’ and ‘survival’ cases. 
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